Less so as automation makes capital capable of production without labour.
Labour and capital are both factors of production. But they are not opposed; it's not one or the other; you need both. They leverage off one another. Increasing the capital employed in a business makes the labour in that business more productive.
(There are no businesses that run with no labour at all. At the very least, somebody has to raise the capital, and make decisions about how it can best be employed; that work is labour. Extremely powerful and capable machines that do not operate because nobody decides what use to make of them are not productive at all. And, realistically, even automated machinery requires installation; it requires maintenance; it requires repair; and it requires someone to be responsible for makinkg and implementing decisions about how it is to be used.
Sure, a thriving business may require very few workers, but not
no workers. And, if it can thrive with very few workers, those workers are highly productive. There may be social and other problems associated with such high productivity — see below but these are problems of high productivity, not low productivity.)
Labour productivity has become less important. In fact the 5 remaining employees may be no more productive, maybe they will be less productive.
They're
massively productive. If there are 5 employees and the company generates revenue of, say, €10 million p.a., then the productivity of each employee is €2 million p.a. Measured as an hourly rate, which is the usual way of measuring labour productivity, that's about €1,000/hr. That's
huge.
Of course, they're only that productive because of the capital investment. But that's nothing new; giving workers power tools intead of hand tools raises their productivity, as does replacing the horse-and-cart with a lorry. Etc, etc. This is just a further instance of the same phenomenon; capital investment tends to raise labour productivity. That's why investment happens, mostly.
One of the social problems associated with this is that this phenomenon is unevenly distributed. Some businesses (like the hypothetical one we have been discussing) have huge potential to raise the productivity of workers through capital investment; others have much more limited potential to do so (like, say, a care home for the elderly — the frontline staff there are not easily replaced by AI or industrial robots, and there's no technology which will enable one care assistant to tend simultaneously to 50 patients where previously they tended only to one). So this gives rise to two issues:
First, the workers who do become vastly more productive expect — not unreasonably — that a share of their increased productivity will accrue to them in higher wages. Historically, this has happened, which is why real wages have risen in capitalist economies. But there is some evidence that it's not happening as efficiently as it used to — a larger and larger share of productivity increases accrues to the owners of the capital invested.
Secondly, even if you solve that problem, you would then have the problem of a two tier workforce — a small cohort of well-paid workers who have jobs made vastly more productive by technological advances, and a large cohort of workers whose wages and livings standard stagnate (or worse). And obviously that causes all kinds of societally undesireable outcomes.
In the context of this thread — transfer payments to support retirees — we've already seen that one of the mechanisms for facilitating this is pension funds. Workers save, the savings are invested in equities; in retirement they live off the dividends from the equities (and the phased sale of the equities). But for the large cohort of workers whose wages stagnate for most of their working lives, saving is very difficult. So these workers are going to have to rely on the other mechanism; social insurance.
But that's also problematic, because the social insurance transfers have to be funded out of tax. And, just as the poorly-paid workers have limited capacity to save, they also have limited capacity to pay more tax. So the tax burden of these transfers will largely fall on the well-paid, highly productive workers.
You might think that, being well-paid, they can afford it, but that's not how they're likely to see it. And their dissatisfaction will be aggravated by the knowledge that they are paying handsomely to sustain a social security system that is of relatively little benefit to them — they're the cohort who have pension funds, remember, and they themselves will receive funded pensions in retirement. So the political stability of the whole system looks to be in jeopardy.
You could justify all this as a mechanism for sharing the surplus value generated by automation, AI and other technological advances. But it's a very indirect and slow-burning way of doing that, and probably very inefficient. It would be better if we could devise ways of sharing that surplus wealth as it's created, so as to avoid the growing division of the community into a small cohort of highly advantaged people and a larger cohort of stagnating people in the first place.