BIG-notorious
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There's another element as well.Remember why the sales to the vulture funds happened in the first place — the banks' business model, in the conditions of the time, had proven to be unviable.
In the US at the time "jingle mail" was increasingly common, where borrowers sent the keys to their property to the bank in the mail because walking away from the property and walking away from the debt were one and the same thing.
In Ireland by contrast, the mortgage was secured on the property as a first legal charge but it was owed by the borrower personally. So for a borrower in negative equity they could still be in debt for €100k or whatever the negative equity amount was even after leaving their home and it being sold by the lender.
- They would remain liable for a large debt
- They would have to find and fund housing for themselves
- The 5 year clock for their CCR record of the mortgage would not be reset.
- Although all loans over €500 being recorded on the CCR happened after the crash; a younger and much less responsible me discovered this after repaying my credit cards and eliminating my mortgage arrears (negative equity was never an issue) when I went to remortgage and was basically told that as visa and my lender weren't signed up to the CCR's predecessor all of my financial bad behaviour had disappeared like it never happened. Yay!
- This was an intended feature of Irish mortgages; I recall the expressions on a number of clients' faces when I explained to them that the debt could follow them after the sale of their home by the lender if prices fell below the mortgage balance. And then I generally said something along the lines of "But sure that'll never happen"...
But I'd argue that mortgage terms should be secured on the property only, and once the property is in the possession of the mortgage lender the debt should disappear and (subject to the 5 year limit on the CCR) the borrower is then free and clear of that loan.
- This would incentivise the lenders to be more cautious in their lending
- Borrowers would have a reason to hand back properties with loans they couldn't repay, so they could start again, and hopefully negate the need for lenders to sell the mortgages to vulture funds to crystallise their losses.
- Even if vulture funds were required, the ability of borrowers to just walk away would incentivise them to treat them reasonably fairly (there's no such incentive now) so as not to kill the goose laying their golden eggs: I'd lay heavy bets that a mortgage with a reasonable rate being repaid more or less on schedule is usually more valuable than the secured property laying vacant for at least 6 months while paying legal fees, auctioneer fees, accruing interest on the loan which financed the mortgage while the mortgage balance was frozen.
There's more than one way to skin a cat. Or pluck a vulture.
The lenders would have a whole load of poorly valued debt on their balance sheets and this would have impacted their capitalisation levelsBack in the day, when the banking crisis was being resolved, what would have happened if sales to the vulture funds had not been possible?
- If anyone looks at their Credit Union annual statements over the last decade, there's always a "bad debt" and "bad debt recovered" section. They write off bad debts while still pursuing them, so they overstate their losses. If your problem is that people don't owe you enough money (and this is the CU's problem) then it's just an accounting exercise. If you've a huge amount of borrowings- which require refinancing- against a huge amount of lending then the "bad debts" section can be a huge problem even if the majority of those debts turn out to be problematic rather than actually bad.
- Business hates uncertainty, and the value of a mortgage in arrears during the crash was horribly uncertain. Without offloading them or otherwise crystallising them (ie vulture funds) no refinancing of the bonds owed to the bank etc. And the ECB probably wouldn't have helped out so much either (and giving a loan at 3% when the alternative was 10% or even 4% amounted to a gift of many billions of euro to the Irish taxpayer- attaching strings in such circumstances is not unreasonable).
Far to easy to game that system. All I have to do is set up a shell to buy the loans and a holding company to borrow to fund the purchase. The holding company lends the money to the shell company at a markup and the borrower is paying credit card rates on their mortgage again.There may be another way to approach the problem, which is to focus not on the interest rate that the bank lenders charge but on the margin they give themselves over their cost of funds. Would it be feasible to identify that margin, and then regulate the vulture funds so that could not take more than that margin over their cost of funds?
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