MORAL HAZARD SMORAL HAZARD: Why the Moral Hazard Argument is Dumb!
Isn’t it funny how the Bankers, Civil Servants, Accountants, Auditors, Politicians who caused the current financial crisis are the ones arguing against the necessary steps to stop the bleeding?
Moral hazard, while real sometimes and in some places, is vastly overrated as an effect.
Granted, it’s seductive in the same way that risk homeostasis is — the notion that, for example, people drive faster and take more risks because they have seatbelts — but like risk homeostasis, moral hazard is vastly over-diagnosed.
People don’t project five years into the future and say, “Leverage up, boys and girls. We’ll either make a lot of money now, or be bailed out later.”
Real people in real situations don’t think that way. Matter of fact, if anything, they’re short-sighted in that regard to a fault.
http://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cj29n1/cj29n1-12.pdf See below for an extract.
My question who failed who!
Isn’t it funny how the Bankers, Civil Servants, Accountants, Auditors, Politicians who caused the current financial crisis are the ones arguing against the necessary steps to stop the bleeding?
Moral hazard, while real sometimes and in some places, is vastly overrated as an effect.
Granted, it’s seductive in the same way that risk homeostasis is — the notion that, for example, people drive faster and take more risks because they have seatbelts — but like risk homeostasis, moral hazard is vastly over-diagnosed.
People don’t project five years into the future and say, “Leverage up, boys and girls. We’ll either make a lot of money now, or be bailed out later.”
Real people in real situations don’t think that way. Matter of fact, if anything, they’re short-sighted in that regard to a fault.
http://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cj29n1/cj29n1-12.pdf See below for an extract.
The Nature of Moral Hazard
A moral hazard is where one party is responsible for the interests of another, but has an incentive to put his or her own interests first: the standard example is a worker with an incentive to shirk on the job. Financial examples include the following:
• I might sell you a financial product (e.g., a mortgage) knowing that it is not in your interests to buy it.
• I might pay myself excessive bonuses out of funds that I am managing on your behalf; or
• I might take risks that you then have to bear.
Moral hazards such as these are a pervasive and inevitable feature of the financial system and of the economy more generally. Dealing with them—by which I mean, keeping them under reasonable con- trol—is one of the principal tasks of institutional design.
My question who failed who!