As it stands we are setting ourselves up for this situation to happen all over again - the banks now know that they can take any kind of risk and rely on the taxpayer to provide a safety net. In the good years, an Irish bank will make a couple of billion euro in profit, in a bad year the taxpayer can pick up the tab.
I think this [broken link removed] says it all.
If we want banks with unlimited depositor protection then we should constitute them in this way and force them to insure these schemes on the open market. Or it could be an option for depositors to have an insured account or a higher interest uninsured account.
Another option would be to force irish banks in future to be constituted as unlimited liability companies. As such the shareholders might take a more conservative approach to risk.
As it stands we are setting ourselves up for this situation to happen all over again - the banks now know that they can take any kind of risk and rely on the taxpayer to provide a safety net. In the good years, an Irish bank will make a couple of billion euro in profit, in a bad year the taxpayer can pick up the tab.
I think this [broken link removed] says it all.
Why not? it's looking like the best option to me.Letting the banks go bust is not an option
Why is it important to prevent the main Irish banks from closing?Few people realise how important Irish banking is and why preserving the existing banks has a wider national interest dimension.
What is wrong with having foreign banks?One of the dilemmas faced by Government is how to ensure the national banking system does not become dominated by foreign banks
The main reasons for saving the banks that have been put forward are to maintain a supply of credit in the economy and to avoid a risk of losses for depositors. I don't believe either of these things would happen
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Secondly, does anyone else not find it astonishing that the entire former board of Anglo and Irish Nationwide are not in prison pending charges? Wouldn't that send a clear signal to international investors that maybe we are not a nation of crooks and corruption after all?
Yes, but would that disruption not be better than the state borrowing an additional 70 or 80 billion at a time when we least afford it to plug a hole in the balance sheets of some privately owned companies?Just think about it, do you really believe that there wouldn't be serious disruption if most of the businesses in the country were forced to immediately find alternative lines of credit?
What is the implication? People have to put their money somewhere.Also, the implications of people not being able to trust banks to return their deposits is not a road we want to go down
They have a solvency problem not a liquidity problem. Lending money to them will make their balance sheets look even worse.Instead of NAMA buying these assets at inflated prices, why can't the government just loan the banks the money?
For example if the assets are worth 40 billion and the government is going to buy them for 60 billion, why can't they just lend the banks 20 billion which can be paid back to the government over 15-20 years. That way the risk of selling these assets is with the banks not the taxpayer.
I'm sure it would be more complicated than my example but there must be some way that the risk is with the banks ans not the taxpayer.
Indeed you can be imprisoned without charge - for up to 7 days in Ireland - but only under suspicion of serious violent crimes.You cant put people in prision "pending charges"!
Yes, but would that disruption not be better than the state borrowing an additional 70 or 80 billion at a time when we least afford it to plug a hole in the balance sheets of some privately owned companies?
And better they put it in banks in the knowledge that they'll get it back rather than stuff it under their mattress for two reasonsWhat is the implication? People have to put their money somewhere
Most people cannot seperate the global liquidity crisis (now abating) from a domestic banking system solvency crisis caused by the collapse in the property bubble or to put it another way the demise of an economic policy that promoted, facilitated and funded a construction led consumption boom. Irish banks continuing problems are directly related to solvency - or going concern risks which will not be fully dealt with until banks balance sheets are cleansed of boom time bad debts. Furthermore as the economy enters into a deflationary spiral there is little chance the so called international green shoots will sprout global growth at levels required to stave off what will become yet another lost Irish decade. Worse still if, as some are predicting, a double dip occurs fuelled by commodity, food and oil inflation. Letting the banks go bust is not an option - funding their survival, and consolidation will require fresh government investment or a PPP scheme of joint government and private ownership. Few people realise how important Irish banking is and why preserving the existing banks has a wider national interest dimension. One of the dilemmas faced by Government is how to ensure the national banking system does not become dominated by foreign banks when it cannot afford to opt for the temporary nationalisation route. The costs of bailing out banking will be dwarfed by the final costs of economic recovery - whenever this occurs.
By the way, NAMA is not bailing out the developers; they will have to repay NAMA instead of the banks. It is bailing out the banks so the beneficiaries are shareholders (pension funds) and depositors.
NAMA is designed to bail out banking – which is a necessary and inevitable consequence of the crisis as they are insolvent.
rather than end up with a messy and potentially catastrophic firesale when there is no market, and commercial real estate valuations are close to zero. That would have hit our pockets a hell of a lot harder
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