The absurd recount situation in Ireland South could have been avoided simply if more staff had been there from the beginning.
They had around 200 - it would be difficult too manage a lot more
It's supposed to be a secret ballot, so if you can determine how a person voted, e.g. by printing a record of how a person voted, it's not secret.Surely in this technological age an electronic voting system that prints a record of how a person voted in a secure hold for sporadic checking can be easily and quite cheaply be developed.
Under what I said it's still a secret ballot. It's a printed record of what a voter who turned up at the polling station decided. No identifying mark is on it, but allows for checking.It's supposed to be a secret ballot, so if you can determine how a person voted, e.g. by printing a record of how a person voted, it's not secret.
Here's a current example from Switzerland that shows the problems. It's not sufficient just to provide a secret ballot and do the count. The system must not only be non-hackable, but be capable of proving it has not been hacked. ttps://www.theregister.co.uk/2019/03/12/swiss_evoting_system_vulnerability/.
The main issue was fear. People were told that there was "potential" for fraud. There's massive potential for fraud in the current system too (especially postal votes)I think e-voting was trialled in 3 constituencies in 2002. Apart from the concerns about security, etc that arose later, there was also a concern that getting the results at "the push of a button" obscured the intricacies of our PR transferrable vote system. There was quite a widespread view that the hand-counting method helped people understand better the value of voting right along all, or most, of the preferences. People are unlikely to tune in to some type of tutorial on multi-candidate PR voting but they picked up the rules by following the hand counts, if only casually. Like a sport, I suppose.
Also, that people were likely to feel more trust when they could witness, or hear ongoing reports, on how transfers were going.
I think e-voting was trialled in 3 constituencies in 2002. Apart from the concerns about security, etc that arose later
The main issue was fear. People were told that there was "potential" for fraud. There's massive potential for fraud in the current system too (especially postal votes)
That's corrected by simple stage management.
I think e-voting was trialled in 3 constituencies in 2002.
Under what I said it's still a secret ballot. It's a printed record of what a voter who turned up at the polling station decided. No identifying mark is on it, but allows for checking.
I have never once been asked for ID at a polling station once i have my voting card that is posted out, which is surely far more insecure than any electronic system.
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