Why auto-enrolment pensions are ‘a disaster in the making’

LDFerguson

Registered User
Messages
4,771
From the Times at the weekend. Brian Woods pointing out some huge flaws in the Auto Enrolment system, with contributions from @Colm Fagan ...

Why auto-enrolment pensions are ‘a disaster in the making’

The new state retirement savings system, due to launch in September, could leave up to 200,000 higher earners worse off, according to experts

https://www.thetimes.com/article/fc9f234d-d501-4e55-a236-73e9df907c28



Brian Woods didn’t plan to become a campaigner against the government’s plans to introduce an auto-enrolment pensions system this year, but he has made it his mission to raise the alarm over what he sees as deep flaws in the scheme.

“I’m retired and I can’t play golf, so this is what I do instead,” he says.

The former financial director at Ark Life and self-employed actuary is trying to draw attention to a glaring defect in the incentive structure for the new system that could mean up to 200,000 people are forced into a financially inferior set-up when it goes live on September 30.

Those affected are workers who pay tax at the higher rate of 40 per cent and, therefore, are entitled to tax relief at that level on pension contributions. But this group is about to be swept up into the new state scheme automatically because they are not currently enrolled in a private or occupational scheme with their employer, meaning they will have to put in 1.5 per cent of their earnings unless they opt out.

However, the state’s auto-enrolment system isn’t offering the same tax relief as a private or occupational pension would. Instead, the state is contributing €1 for every €3 an auto-enrolled member puts in, which works out as substantially less attractive for this group.

“If you were starting with a blank sheet of paper, €1 for €3 is the best way,” says Woods, before pointing out that, for higher earners, the existing system is twice as financially beneficial as auto-enrolment. “But this is practically unworkable in parallel with the existing system. You need to fix it before it goes live. Launching it as it is would turn out to be a disaster.”

Woods has been joined in his efforts by his old boss Colm Fagan, another retired actuary, whose career spanned Standard Life, Hannover Re and Berkshire Hathaway. Fagan has been poking holes in auto-enrolment for months, although his main gripe is that the system exposes members to too much investment risk rather than “smoothing” outcomes for pensioners on retirement.

The two believe the misaligned financial incentives are just one of many cracks in the foundation of auto-enrolment that could bring down the whole edifice before its planned launch this autumn.

But they see a window of opportunity for the government to act by delaying its implementation and ordering an independent review to iron out the kinks before it goes live.

With the launch of the agency overseeing the system not yet established and other key milestones still in the distance, they think the government needs to reconsider — otherwise it risks undermining the system.

“The penny will drop eventually and it won’t go ahead,” Woods says. “Are they going to put people in auto-enrolment even though they’d be better off going in another direction? The whole thing is messy and impractical and it’s not going to work.”

The two list several issues that have yet to be resolved: no request for tender has been issued for asset managements to run the investment strategies; no fee structure has been agreed; and nobody knows if or how enrolled members can move between auto-enrolment and private schemes when their financial circumstances change.

They point to the UK’s Nest system — the model for Ireland’s scheme — which has indeed increased enrolment in retirement savings, but has a high dropout rate, low levels of investment and high administration costs.

But the key issue for them is the big difference between the benefit the state provides across two parallel systems, which creates an arbitrage opportunity.

“The best way to get out of this is a root-and-branch review of the whole thing,” Fagan says.

Originally proposed by the late Fianna Fail minister Séamus Brennan in 2006 as a way to expand pensions coverage more universally across the workforce, the idea was later championed by Labour’s Joan Burton, somewhat forlornly in the depths of the financial crisis. So for a long time it was just that — an idea, something that could be implemented in other countries such as Australia, but not ready for reality in Ireland.

It wasn’t until 2018, under Fine Gael’s Regina Doherty, that consultation with stakeholders began in earnest with the publication of a “straw man proposal” setting out a draft design for the system. This is where the €1 for €3 incentive structure was conceived.

Doherty’s successor Heather Humphreys shepherded the proposal through the various stages of consensus formation, eventually producing a piece of legislation last June, with the launch date of September 30 confirmed in October, just in time for the general election.

But the disquiet around the design of the system, which was there from the start, never really went away. In fact, the potential for arbitrage — effectively taking advantage of inequalities between the existing pensions system and auto-enrolment — was identified early in the process, yet nothing was done to address it.

An internal departmental paper written in 2020, “Designing a financial incentive for the automatic enrolment retirement savings system”, laid out the problem clearly.

The proposed auto-enrolment matching system values the net contribution from the state at 33.3 per cent of the member’s contribution. However, a worker taxed at the standard rate of 20 per cent gets the equivalent of a 25 per cent contribution via tax relief, while someone taxed at the higher rate of 40 per cent gets a 66.7 per cent boost from the state.

The incentives are clear. The 600,000 workers without a pension who are on the lower rate of tax are getting a better deal from auto-enrolment, but the 200,000 who pay tax at the higher rate would only get half the benefit available to them from a private pension scheme.

As the report notes: “One could envisage that there would be significant pushback if individuals were ‘unknowingly’ defaulted into a system which was ‘knowingly’ less attractive to them on the basis of financial incentives.”

“That 47-page paper sets out very explicitly that there’s a real problem here,” Woods says. “If that paper had been published, it would have stirred up huge debate.”

That debate has yet to emerge, though, as awareness of auto-enrolment remains quite low. Data from the Central Statistics Office, published in December, showed just 28 per cent of eligible workers were aware of the scheme. That lack of awareness means many will be swept into a savings system without having assessed whether it suits their financial circumstances.

Unsurprisingly, the pensions industry was alert to this problem from early in the process. Consultation submissions, excerpted in the report, from advisers and providers almost uniformly warned of the opportunity to game the incentives, with several warning explicitly of “arbitrage”.

“There is a risk of undoing the significant coverage already achieved by the existing regime if members are confused as to which regime would be more beneficial to them and try to select against the system,” wrote the Association of Pension Lawyers.

Mercer pointed out “a huge arbitrage opportunity that will inevitably be exploited”, while the Irish Association of Pension Funds lamented “a whole new level of complexity”.

The report offered three alternative funding options to deal with the problems identified with the €1-for-€3 incentives, but none were taken up in the final design. Instead, auto-enrolment was constructed with simplicity in mind, the better to communicate its benefits to the target audience and to achieve greater transparency than exists with the current rather ornate system of two-tier tax relief, fund thresholds and contribution limits.

But the engineered simplicity of auto-enrolment didn’t conclusively win the day. A sharp exchange at a February 2023 hearing of the Oireachtas committee on social protection between the TD Éamon Ó Cuív and Tim Duggan, the assistant secretary in the Department of Social Protection in charge of pensions, showed the problem lingered.

The two bickered over sums until Duggan was forced to admit that there was a “difference in outcomes” for someone on the higher rate of tax and that “some people would do better” in a private or occupational scheme, but went on to argue that three quarters of those affected “would be delighted”.

Ó Cuív, for his part, voiced support for a single rate of relief and concluded that “the whole system is rotten because it favours the rich”, who could not only contribute more but get twice the tax relief while doing so.

It therefore makes perfect sense that many consultation submissions early in the design process focused on the preservation of generous tax reliefs for high earners against a possible move to a universal 33 per cent rate for everyone, arguing that it would reduce incentives to save for retirement among those already enrolled in schemes. In effect, a universal rate would risk reducing enrolment among one constituency to increase it with another.

“There is no reason why marginal rate relief on contributions to occupational pension schemes and other schemes cannot sit alongside the proposed auto-enrolment system,” Chartered Accountants Ireland wrote. “Excessive change to the tax benefit system for pension savers could weaken the confidence in the stability of the tax system, thereby reducing the commitment of savers to long-term savings.”

But the industry has gone quiet since the legislation was passed and the timetable for implementation was announced.

Woods thinks this is because the industry sees an opportunity to sell. On the one hand, providers want to set up occupational schemes for employers that wish to avoid getting caught up in auto-enrolment, which is seen as potentially expensive and administratively difficult. On the other hand, employees who are disadvantaged by auto-enrolment could be receptive to pitches for private pensions.

“Arbitrage has been hard-coded into the system, and arbitrage is manna from heaven for any adviser,” Woods says. “It’s going to be a field day for brokers. Financial advisers will jump all over it and auto-enrolment will fall into disrepute.”

Ironically, while higher earners who get caught in the auto-enrolment net are losing out, an unknown number of workers who are contributing to pensions already and getting relief at the standard rate are also missing a benefit. Those employees would have to drop out of existing schemes to get access to auto-enrolment’s comparatively better €1-for-€3 contribution from the state, which effectively offers €1 for €4 in the conventional system.

Rather than neatly getting a huge portion of the workforce tidily into a state-administered scheme, there could be a scramble for the best deal as members become aware of the advantages of seeking out the best incentive, toggling between systems or opting out entirely, according to Woods.

“That’s probably even worse,” he says. “It’ll be total chaos.”
 
The Sunday Times article was largely informed by a paper the DSP prepared in 2020, which @Brian Woods extracted earlier this year under FOI.
The Department never published the paper. The only reason I can see for them wanting to keep it from public scrutiny is that, if they had published it, they would never have dared go ahead with the scheme as enacted.

For example, here's just one extract:

"it is estimated that those who would benefit more from the matching contribution approach [i.e., State contribution €1 for every €3 by the employee] is likely to be closer to 75 per cent or around 440,000 people. Nevertheless, there will be a sizable population who would potentially be better off if they saved for their retirement through the current system.

Some other issues that might be caused by operating different incentive systems side-by-side include:

  1. Compromise the coherency of the system by creating communications difficulties;
  2. Make it difficult to parallel the systems and provide clarity as to who must be enrolled leading to compliance difficulties;
  3. Make it challenging for Registered Providers to cost their participation (as higher yielding members may well migrate from AE);
  4. The potential to jeopardise the objective of maximising economies of scale in AE;
  5. Engineering the need for advice into the AE system which may preclude or inhibit the ability to create a ‘default’ option (i.e. one could envisage that there would be significant pushback if individuals were ‘unknowingly’ defaulted into a system which was ‘knowingly’ less attractive to them on the basis of financial incentives, etc.);
  6. Complexity and possibly excluding the ability to transfer between AE and the existing system;
  7. Particular complexity in relation to how the two systems may operate at drawdown;
  8. Compromising the State’s income smoothing objective due to a loss of revenue in the future in the face of demographic projections."
By the way, bullet points 7 and 8 show that they believed at the time that benefits would be tax-free.
Looking at point 5, it's a damning indictment of the scheme that workers could be "'unknowingly' defaulted into a system which was 'knowingly' less attractive to them on the basis of financial incentives, etc.". That is exactly where we are now.
To quote Laurel and Hardy: "That's another fine mess you've gotten us into" - and it's going to cost us, the nation, a fortune to get out of it, given all they've spent on consultants, the contract with Tata Consulting Services, etc.
 
Last edited:
Woods should learn to play golf:)

@GSheehy is your thumbs down aimed at the article or at the "fine mess" that the DSP are stubbornly getting into? This is how the DSP sees the issue:
DSP rep at JOC said:
As I said at the beginning, and maybe the Deputy [O'Cuiv] missed this, you either buy the premise that people should be treated equally in terms of incentivisation and that every man’s [none of this woke nonsense for the DSP] euro is as valuable as another’s. If you do not [i.e. if you are a rabid neo con], then you will definitely be in the tax relief camp. If you do [i.e. if you are a true comrade], you cannot be in the tax relief camp. That is what it boils down to.
But this is not about your ideological stance on social issues but about the bleeding obvious, you cannot run two different incentive systems in parallel unless one is compulsory.

What about this?
DSP rep at JOC said:
I remember sitting in Cabinet meetings listening to Ministers discussing this and they were very clear that there had to be equality of treatment for all participants in the scheme.
Is that not a breach of cabinet confidentiality?:)
 
Last edited:
I wrote an blog about this in 2022. It is indeed a disaster for higher earners and not just because of the lower tax relief.

  1. Earning cap of €80,000, so no contributions on anything earned over that amount.
  2. No AVC facility into the scheme. As far as I am aware, DSP have not clarified on how someone can make additional contributions if they want to contribute more that 1.5%. I presume it is to go back into the private market and take out a PRSA AVC.
  3. Retirement age is tied to the State pension. There is no option to draw down your pension before that date.

https://www.bluewaterfp.ie/pensions/is-the-auto-enrollment-scheme-beneficial-for-those-paying-income-tax-at-the-higher-rate/ (Is the auto enrollment scheme beneficial for those paying income tax at the higher rate)​


Steven
http://www.bluewaterfp.ie (www.bluewaterfp.ie)
 
I take your points @Steven Barrett but I think it is not unreasonable to have a cap for AE. Not just because it leaves space for the industry to “sell” supplementary schemes.
AE does suffer from those disadvantages you mention but enhancements can be made later, and indeed things like AVCs and flexibility on the contribution rate have been flagged as such potential enhancements.
The collision between two contradictory systems running in parallel is fatal IMHO.
 
Auto-enrolment will only apply to those who both (a) have no existing workplace pension arrangements and also (b) do not opt out.

For everyone who neither has an existing pension arrangement nor opts out, for every €3 they put into the pension scheme, their employer will put in another €3 and the government will put in €1.
  • So for every €7 in their auto-enrolment pension, it will only cost the individual employee €3, or 42% of total contributions.
Nobody will be enrolled in this system if they have an occupational pension, so the only relevant comparison is those people who set up their own PRSA.
  • At the higher tax rate for all of the contributions, the person would receive 40% tax back and therefore the pension will cost the individual employee 60% of total contributions.
  • At the lower tax rate for all contributions, the person receives 20% tax relief so it costs them 80% of total contributions.
So anyone automatically enrolled will be better off in terms of net cost per euro of contributions than someone who has set up their PRSA. The relative benefit is higher to a lower tax rate employee, but they're both quite a lot better off.

Under the Act (section 51 for anyone who cares to check) an employee will not be auto-enrolled if they're in an exempt employment defined as (basically) either (a) they are making pension contributions via their payroll or (b) their employer is making contributions. Importantly, there doesn't seem to be any exemption where an employee is making contributions but not the payroll system, which suggests that where someone is paying by monthly direct debit they can have their cake and eat it, ie they can enroll in auto-enrolment for the lower net cost per euro contribution while at the same time pay into their PRSA via monthly contributions and sort out their own tax relief.

So in summary, I fail to see the disadvantage to any employee (in terms of net cost per €1 contributed) of auto-enrolment. Some will certainly benefit more than others in comparison with setting up their own PRSA outside of the payroll system but nobody will lose out on that side, well boo-hoo for the poor downtrodden higher earners (of which, for the record, I am one).

So in terms of the cost per euro contribution, nobody will be disadvantaged by auto-enrolment. That's just maths.

There's actually a strong argument that auto-enrolment will in the long run save higher taxpayers a ton of cash. After 10 years the overall contribution will be 14%. If that's paid on the median wage of €38k for 30 years, that will mean total contributions of €160k. Assuming all that does is keep pace with inflation and is drawn down over 20 years, that's €8k extra into the economy a year per retiree, half of which will find its way back to the exchequer one way or another.
  • Considering those dependent on the OAP pay zero income tax and the rapidly reducing ratio of workers to retirees, that should eventually see an average reduction in the tax burden of €4k per annum per worker. Not all of this would be income taxes obviously, as it would be spread across VAT, corporate tax, income taxes, and probably other taxes I've never heard of. But a conservative reduction of €80 a week @ current values isn't to be sniffed at.
There are other valid discussions to be had on the structure of auto-enrolment. For example I think an employee should be permitted to direct the contributions to any approved pension provider outside of the default if they choose, or to transfer the pot to another provider as you could a normal PRSA.
  • It'd also be nice if people who do have an occupational scheme could also opt for auto enrolment benefits instead because honestly I'm pretty confident I'd be much better off in retirement shoving an extra 14% of my gross into my PRSA rather than paying 4.5% for a crappy Single Scheme pension.

But complaining that higher earning tax payers won't gain quite as much proportionally as lower earning taxpayers because they will be treated exactly equally seems just smacks of pure begrudgery. Short-sighted begrudgery, given that higher rate taxpayers are the ones who'll ultimately benefit most from more lower paid taxpayers having private pensions separate to the OAP.
 
Nobody will be enrolled in this system if they have an occupational pension, so the only relevant comparison is those people who set up their own PRSA.
And the latter can just opt out and stick to their PRSA or other private pension can't they?
It'd also be nice if people who do have an occupational scheme could also opt for auto enrolment benefits instead because honestly I'm pretty confident I'd be much better off in retirement shoving an extra 14% of my gross into my PRSA rather than paying 4.5% for a crappy Single Scheme pension.
I don't understand this point and it actually seems contradictory?
 
There's so much work that needs to be done on the scheme. @Steven Barrett mentions three key areas. Then there's the more recent announcement that there will be a fixed charge - as yet unknown - in addition to the previously-published charges. As has been said here and elsewhere, fixed charges impact small contributions and funds more than larger ones, thus penalising the key demographic the AE scheme is trying to help.

The collision between two contradictory systems running in parallel is fatal IMHO.

I agree that running two systems is going to cause yet more complexity in area that's already far too complex. But is it really the fatal flaw? Take for example a high-rate taxpayer earning €60,000 and not in a pension scheme at present. She gets railroaded into AE and gets a worse Government contribution than if she had gone into an old-style pension plan with 40% tax relief. But...

  • Before AE her employer was not contributing anything, as is its right. Now the employer must double her contribution, on top of the Government contribution. Before AE she was contributing nothing towards a pension. Now she is.
  • What's the alternative? Revise tax relief on all (non AE) pension contributions in line with AE? That would be an effective tax increase for anyone paying into a pension and paying tax at 40%, so anyone earning over €42,000. Raise the Government contribution on AE to bring it into line with old-style tax relief? What would that cost us?
 
So 200000 who currently don't belong to a pension will be automatically enrolled in a pension scheme. They can, if they want to, opt out after 6 months and get their contributions back. If they don't, they will not be in the most efficient scheme but at least they will be in a scheme so I'm, not seeing "a disaster" so far.

If anything, by forcing people into a scheme, it may wake them up and many of them may opt out and go into a better more efficient scheme.

It may not be the most effective scheme that could have been developed but it is better then nothing and at the end of the day, everyone is responsible for managing their own financial affairs.
 
I agree that running two systems is going to cause yet more complexity in area that's already far too complex. But is it really the fatal flaw?
Society of Actuaries in Ireland in letter to DOF said:
We are concerned at the extent of the discrepancy for marginal rate tax payers (i.e. 25% of those likely to be enrolled in AE according to ESRI). In particular we feel the early success of the new AE system may be undermined if there is widespread criticism of the tax anomaly amongst financial commentators and those providing financial advice etc. Such commentary will likely point to the 40% relief available to pension savers under the current system (i.e. where each €100 pension contribution from gross pay costs €60 from net pay so a State incentive of €40 or double the “1 for 3” State matching of €20 envisaged for an equivalent pension contribution to the AE system.
2020 internal DSP paper issued after strawman consultation but only released this month under FOI said:
Engineering the need for advice into the AE system which may preclude or inhibit the ability to create a ‘default’ option (i.e. one could envisage that there would be significant pushback if individuals were ‘unknowingly’ defaulted into a system which was ‘knowingly’ less attractive to them on the basis of financial incentives, etc.)
My emphasis, "pushback" is a gross understatement. And remember that even if a punter is aware of the anomaly they still have to be auto-enrolled for 6 months.

And what about those conscientious employers who already have a scheme. Their standard rate employees come screaming "why are these delinquent prodigal sons who never bothered having a scheme being offered an inducement 33% better than our tax relief? Please set up an AE scheme forthwith for us too"

Wind forward to 2065. Fred and Wilma have done well and are in the 40% tax bracket. They are celebrating their retirement in the local and share thoughts. Fred says "really good idea that 1 for 3 top-up which was introduced when I joined our pension scheme". Wilma indulges a condescending laugh. "What an idiot?! My employer was approached by a broker who set of a scheme giving me 2 for 3 top-up". A crestfallen Fred does some mental arithmetic to calculate what he missed out on. And he didn't have the mental arithmetic capacity to add compound interest.
 
Last edited:
Can't they just opt for a regular private pension instead so?

People can join a private pension scheme, but they will still be auto enrolled and need to opt out if they want to. BTW It currently appears you can max out contributions to a private pension and have a EA pension as well.
 
Last edited:
Nobody will be enrolled in this system if they have an occupational pension, so the only relevant comparison is those people who set up their own PRSA.
This is not correct. But I have heard DSP folk dismiss any criticism that the 1 for 3 top-up is inferior to 40% relief with "your missing the point that with AE there is an employer 1 for 1 match which swamps any advantage that a punter might see in going the PRSA route".
Here's the deal - any employer who does not currently have a pension scheme for her employees will be obliged to either sign up for AE or set up a conventional scheme which passes the DSP tests to be at least as good as AE. These tests are yet to be announced but will almost certainly require an ER match at least as generous as 1 for 1 (up to the AE contribution rate).
So the ER match is a total red herring. The choice for the employer and her employees who currently have no scheme is to either go AE or set up a conventional scheme. The latter suits the higher earners and the former suits the others. In fact the employer has no choice - she must set up two schemes and have an arrangement where the lucky broker who is advising her reviews each employee annually to assess which scheme is the better. Yep, "mana from heaven" for brokers.
There's actually a strong argument that auto-enrolment will in the long run save higher taxpayers a ton of cash. After 10 years the overall contribution will be 14%. If that's paid on the median wage of €38k for 30 years, that will mean total contributions of €160k. Assuming all that does is keep pace with inflation and is drawn down over 20 years, that's €8k extra into the economy a year per retiree, half of which will find its way back to the exchequer one way or another.
So how do you explain the following quote from the 2020 DSP paper setting out the issues with the 1 for 3 match?
DSP 2020 paper said:
8. Compromising the State’s income smoothing objective due to a loss of revenue in the future in the face of demographic projections."

But complaining that higher earning tax payers won't gain quite as much proportionally as lower earning taxpayers because they will be treated exactly equally seems just smacks of pure begrudgery.
You don't happen to be a comrade of the DSP rep who presented to the JOC?
DSP rep putting Deputy O'Cuiv down at JOC said:
As I said at the beginning, and maybe the Deputy missed this, you either buy the premise that people should be treated equally in terms of incentivisation and that every man’s euro is as valuable as another’s. If you do not, then you will definitely be in the tax relief camp. If you do, you cannot be in the tax relief camp. That is what it boils down to.
 
Last edited:
I'm sure that is been covered elsewhere, but this also seems like a big flaw with AE. However I presume that participants can opt for higher growth/volatility/risk investment options?

AE Bill said:
69. (1) An investment management contract shall require the investment management
provider to provide a UCITS or an alternative investment fund for the purposes of this
Part within each of the risk levels set out in subsection (3).
...
(3) Subject to subsection (7), the risk levels for the purposes of this Part are:
(a) the higher risk level, consisting of AE provider schemes with a risk rating of 5, 6
or 7; [my comment - this is high risk indeed, I think Bitcoin is level 6]
(b) the medium risk level, consisting of AE provider schemes with a risk rating of 3
or 4;[ 4 or 5 would be your typical equity fund]
(c) the lower risk level, consisting of AE provider schemes with a risk rating of 1 [cash] or
2 [bonds].
(6) In making regulations under subsection (5) the Minister shall have regard to—
(a) any scale and methodology applying under an enactment or European Union act
for the purpose of indicating the level of risk of a UCITS or alternative [I have been quoting the PRIIPS regulations]
investment fund,
(b) custom and practice in the financial industry in applying scales and
methodologies referred to in paragraph (a) or other scales and methodologies for
...
Assignment of contributions to appropriate risk level
70. (1) Amounts received by the Authority as contributions in respect of a participant shall be
assigned by the Authority to the appropriate risk level.
(2) Where the participant has selected a risk level by a procedure determined under
subsection (3), the appropriate risk level is that level.
(3) The Authority shall determine—
(a) the procedure by which a participant may select a risk level for the purposes of
subsection (2), and
(b) the time or times at which a participant may select a risk level for those purposes.
(4) [The default option which if UK's NEST is anything to go by will be over 95% of the contributors] Where subsection (2) does not apply, the appropriate risk level, subject to
subsection (5), is: [we now see the classic and much criticised so called "lifestyling"]
(a) where the period before the participant reaches pensionable age is more than 15
years, the higher risk level;
(b) where that period is 15 years or less, but more than 5 years, the medium risk
level;
(c) where that period is 5 years or less, the lower risk level.
 
Duke

To be fair, a typical global equity fund would have a risk rating of 5 or 6.

Personally, I think it would have been more straightforward to have everyone on a fixed 60/40 allocation for life. Administering a multitude of different target date funds is going to be very complex without any obvious advantages IMO.
 
Personally, I think it would have been more straightforward to have everyone on a fixed 60/40 allocation for life. Administering a multitude of different target date funds is going to be very complex without any obvious advantages IMO
My understanding is that, from the member's perspective, there will be just three funds - high-risk, medium-risk and low-risk. There won't be a multitude of target date default funds as there are for NEST (i.e., one fund for maturity date 2040, another for maturity date 2039, etc.). Instead, under the default option, contributions are directed to the high-risk fund until the member reaches age 51, then all existing funds are shifted to the medium-risk fund and contributions are invested in that fund until age 61, when everything shifts to the low-risk fund. Thus, you could have the situation that two people are a week apart in age, the market tanks just after the older one reaches age 51, but they're lucky in that all their existing funds were shifted to the lower-risk fund just before the crash, but the younger member misses out by a week and their funds are shifted just after the market has tanked. Thus, a week's difference in age means that they have very different outcomes.
However, this is only a minor issue compared to the tax relief issue mentioned above.
 
Last edited:
Back
Top