Hands up! I made an err. The rent supplement is generally not payable to an individual in full-time work. And alas, ppmeath raises a fair point.
There is an anomaly in the welfare system where someone in receipt of rent supplement may consider not to take a job for fear of losing the rent supplement.
I do not concede that it is so prevalent so as to dramatically affect the tax deductions from paye, prsi, usc, etc.
I do not concede that it is so prevalent so as to dramatically affect the tax deductions from paye, prsi, usc, etc.
14,279 people had their benefits cut due to non-engagement. That's about 5% of those on JSA. I would expect at least half of those targeted by the DSP to engage rather than lose benefits so the pre-investigation % not really engaging of their own accord is probably at least 10%. Allowing further for the DSP not having got around to everyone, I think 10% to 15% non-engagers on JSA is a reasonable number.But the information you posted from the Irish Times, can you give us your interpretation of the information that you posted in relation to the topic being discussed.
It seemed pretty straightforward to me, and I gave my interpretation. But you dont seem to agree with it, so can you provide your interpretation to your information that you posted?
14,279 people had their benefits cut due to non-engagement. That's about 5% of those on JSA. I would expect at least half of those targeted by the DSP to engage rather than lose benefits so the pre-investigation % not really engaging of their own accord is probably at least 10%. Allowing further for the DSP not having got around to everyone, I think 10% to 15% non-engagers on JSA is a reasonable number.
They make perfect sense.Those figures dont make sense.
Johnny is supposed to engage all on his own without a push from the DSP (you might note my phrase "the pre-investigation % not really engaging of their own accord" - no mention of 'with the DSP'). And yet he doesn't - regardless of whether the DSP has got around to him yet.How can someone not engage with DSP before "DSP not having got around to everyone"? How can you class someone as a non-engager before they have had a chance to engage?
The 1% pa is additive until someone engages and has their reduction reversed. So 1% became 2% became 3% etc. The annual rate will slow down as the DSP gets around to everyone but it is still additive. I have found nothing to suggest or support the view that someone so non-engaging as to allow their benefits to be cut will suddenly engage afterwards - but if you have figures for how many reductions are reversed, that would probably knock a couple of % off the 10%-15% number. But as things stand, I'm happy with my number.Your avr detection rate of 1% per year makes more sense. With unemployment figures falling the numbers of non-engagers will decrease, but the detection will remain at 1% of these figures.
You don't know this - it's just your opinion again. The number of non-engagers could very well stay the same (if Johnny doesn't engage for a job when threatened with loss of benefits, what's going to make him engage ever - if he's happy not working when there's high unemployment, why would he be happy working just because unemployment is dropping?) which will actually increase the non-engagers as a % of the JSA population.With unemployment figures falling the numbers of non-engagers will decrease, but the detection will remain at 1% of these figures.
As a side note, I've grown quite fond of Johnny...
It's not an anomaly it is how the system is designed and it is the very essence of what we have been trying to discuss.
If a married man (or woman) with 4 kids is in receipt of this from the state:
"Employment: 20 hrs x €9.15/hr = €183/wk = €9,516/yr
FIS: (€834 - €183) x 60% = €391/wk = €20,332/yr
Rent Allowance: €1,200/mo = €14,400/yr
Child Benefit: €560/mo = €6,720/yr
Plus medical card"
Total: €50,968/yr.
And we remove the CB - bringing it to 46k NET.
Then 40k Gross salary on offer is 32k net (Using the link I gave you earlier), 615 per week, then they will be still entitled to 60% of the difference between 615 and €834, so about 115 a week on top of the 615 - 730.
However they lose 323 per week in rent allowance, then they have the added cost of working, travel, lunches etc.
They had 846 a week (44k net), and now they have the 730 minus the 323 and they have to pay for their own rent
(I am open to correction on the calculations).
I would profoundly disagree and at this point I have to add, that 40k is not an insignificant salary and many, many families manage with rent and mortgages - not easily but they certainly do.
Laughed out loud at that - thanks!!
They make perfect sense.
Johnny is supposed to engage all on his own without a push from the DSP (you might note my phrase "the pre-investigation % not really engaging of their own accord" - no mention of 'with the DSP'). And yet he doesn't - regardless of whether the DSP has got around to him yet.
The 1% pa is additive until someone engages and has their reduction reversed. So 1% became 2% became 3% etc. The annual rate will slow down as the DSP gets around to everyone but it is still additive. I have found nothing to suggest or support the view that someone so non-engaging as to allow their benefits to be cut will suddenly engage afterwards - but if you have figures for how many reductions are reversed, that would probably knock a couple of % off the 10%-15% number. But as things stand, I'm happy with my number.
You don't know this - it's just your opinion again. The number of non-engagers could very well stay the same (if Johnny doesn't engage for a job when threatened with loss of benefits, what's going to make him engage ever - if he's happy not working when there's high unemployment, why would he be happy working just because unemployment is dropping?) which will actually increase the non-engagers as a % of the JSA population.
As a side note, I've grown quite fond of Johnny...
Yes but as I pointed out to you the actual available cash in hand, disposable income, is some €534 (income for 20hrs + FIS + CB - €40 rent contribution, for a couple) a week. And for a family with 4 kids, bills, insurance, food, clothes etc it is liveable but certainly closer to the tight end of things rather than any sort of luxury.
In turn, with a disposable income of €644 a week and 4 kids to feed and clothe it is likely that this willing worker, and his family, faced with paying €1,200 rent out of their disposable income will have their net disposable income reduced to €367 a week from €584.
You have identified a very precise set of circumstances for this design flaw to emerge
One of the criteria for qualifying for rent supplement is that the tenants had been occupying and paying for private rental accommodation for 6/12 months prior to being eligible.
So it is reasonable to assume? that in your example we are not talking about people who are parasites, loafers, or deliberately exploiting the system (as has been levied by some other posters here). We are talking about people who in ordinary circumstances were, and did, pay their own way, and their social insurance, until personal circumstances took a turn for worse (ie loss of employment)
The hope of course is a return to normal circumstances (paying their own way) but in the interim a p/t 20hr week minimum wage job is to hand. This on the one hand, whilst costing the taxpayer, is on the other hand playing its part in the functioning of the economy by fulflling a role for the employer who a required a minimum wage worker for 20hrs a week.
The design flaw materialises when the same employer now requires the employee to work 40hrs due to improved trade and economic conditions all round, but he refuses for fear of losing rent supplement. To make matters worse, the employer hires a second family man of 4 kids who is in receipt of rent supplement ( also a former pay his own way guy who lost his job in the recession), to work the other 20hrs. This is crushing the rest of the workers in taxes and social insurances.
So the proposed solution here is to cut welfare benefits. In this situation, it would be useful if you could identify where/how the cuts are to be made. As it would be necessary to know, if for instance the FIS thresholds were to be reduced, how this would impact on families not in receipt of rent supplement for instance. Or if your chosen cuts would actually provide the desired incentive. Perhaps as an idea FIS could require a person to work 28 hrs rather than the 19+?
This would surely push workers to work more hours. Except of course, if those extra hours are actually available. From your example above the employer would be under pressure to provide 16 extra hours a week. This would affect his wage bill detrimentally if the hours weren't available, and I know you are against increasing wage bills. Alternatively, the option to let one worker go and offer the job full-time to the other worker is an option. But neither one wants the 40 hrs for fear of losing rent supplement, but the employer cant pay 56 hrs in wages either.
So while I appreciate and acknowledge that after 24 pages or so, you have provided a very precise set of circumstances that shows up a design flaw, I would be interested in how your proposal of welfare cuts would actually be applied.
Bearing in mind, it is my contention, that in general such cuts will do nothing more than drive people further into poverty.
But in our discussion, we are only concerned with the portion of that amount that is being provided to people who refuse to take up employment of 30hrs or more for fear of losing the rent supplement. As distinct to the worker who can only get p/t work.
No. That isn't "our" discussion. Not at all.
And this is the "culture of welfare dependency" please, please, refer back to the definition. Many, many, many, many families can manage on much, much,much less.
It's the threat of cutting welfare that should be most effective. The 14,279 are those who absolutely refused despite repeated efforts to get them to engage - there will be many others who did engage under threat of a cut in benefits.If 14,000 had their welfare cut, and after 5yrs, none of them engaged with the system or went and got a job then what does that say about the effectiveness of cutting welfare?
Additionally, while we are not going to let anyone starve,
It sounds reasonable that there would be some re-engagement after benefit cuts (and I'm sure there's bound to be some) but what is strange is that the DSP doesn't seem to produce statistics and/or brag about it. You'd think if an initiative was successful the DSP would want to let everyone know what a great job they are doing. I've looked and can't find any info - so unless you have any numbers, the only thing we know for sure is that 14,279 people had their benefits cut.But your figures still dont factor in those who did decide to re-engage after having their welfare cut.
None that haven't been mentioned already in this thread. I've popped in and out of this thread with numbers/short comments when something looked really off but in general, this type of discussion (long posts, going around in circles) isn't my sort of thing.Im sure you have some ideas, good ones too, lets hear them?
It sounds reasonable that there would be some re-engagement after benefit cuts (and I'm sure there's bound to be some) but what is strange is that the DSP doesn't seem to produce statistics and/or brag about it. You'd think if an initiative was successful the DSP would want to let everyone know what a great job they are doing. I've looked and can't find any info - so unless you have any numbers, the only thing we know for sure is that 14,279 people had their benefits cut.
None that haven't been mentioned already in this thread. I've popped in and out of this thread with numbers/short comments when something looked really off but in general, this type of discussion (long posts, going around in circles) isn't my sort of thing.
God bless yisser energy lads.
If 3,500 have their benefits cut and 2,000 of them repent the follow year and engage, I would expect the DSP to consider this a success and make a big deal about it. I can't find any stats on how successful or otherwise cutting benefits has been at getting people back on full benefits - so I have my doubts that it has actually been successful (beyond the actual cutting of benefits - which the DSP does publish stats about). If people stay on cut benefits, the numbers keep increasing year on year - as my calcs assumed.I dont really get your point about the successful initiative?
You mean apart from your own?Could you at least post one good idea from this thread? I havent see any.
We use cookies and similar technologies for the following purposes:
Do you accept cookies and these technologies?
We use cookies and similar technologies for the following purposes:
Do you accept cookies and these technologies?