This organisation would be happy to take them. They wipe all PCs before they are used afresh.
http://camara.org/
Note there doesn't seem to be any sure way of securely overwriting/erasing a new SSD disk.
The over-write tools will work on them in the same way.
For instance, the FAST paper found that, in most cases, performing a full overwrite of all of the data on the SSD twice was enough to sanitize the disk drive, but there were a few exceptional cases where some of the data still remained present. There may be other reasons not to want to perform repeated overwrites of the full drive: it is very slow, and it may reduce the subsequent lifetime of the drive....
Moreover, the FAST paper found that standard utilities for sanitizing individual files were highly unreliable on SSDs: often a large fraction of the data remained present somewhere on the drive. Therefore, you should assume there is no reliable way to securely erase individual files on a SSD; you need to sanitize the whole drive, as an entire unit.
....
The most reliable way to securely erase an entire SSD is to use the ATA Secure Erase command. However, this is not foolproof. The FAST paper found that most SSDs implement this correctly, but not all. In particular, 8 of the 12 SSDs they studied supported ATA Secure Erase, and 4 did not. Of the 8 that did support it, 3 had a buggy implementation. 1 buggy implementation was really bad: it reported success, but actually left the data laying around.
performing a full overwrite of all of the data on the SSD twice was enough to sanitize the disk drive, but there were a few exceptional cases where some of the data still remained present.
Spare area, often on the order of 8% - 20% of the total flash is set aside for wear leveling purposes. The end user cannot write to this spare area with usual tools, it is reserved for the SSDs controller. But the spare area can hold (smaller) amounts of old user data.
Not correct. It's decades since operating systems were aware of the layout of hard drives in terms of physical tracks, sectors and blocks. Instead, they use logical block addressing (LBA) and let the device controller work out how an address maps onto the physical drive. Until recently, though, you could be guaranteed that a given logical address would map onto the same device location each time you used it. So if you looked at the blocks allocated to a given file in your FAT, you could guarantee to overwrite that file's contents by writing to the same logically numbered blocks. That's no longer true with SSDs. They have a separate map to translate from LBAs to solid state memory locations, and they intentionally alter the map to effect wear-levelling. Even though your FAT stays the same at the LBA level, the actual contents of the memory are constantly being shifted around.There's no possible way it can't work for SSDs, they allocate file space using exactly the same file management system, be that NTFS or FAT. Once a bit is over-written, you cannot tell what was there previously. The tools that let you choose the overwrite pattern, carry out at least 2 over-writes, first using binary pattern 10101010, next using 01010101, so you're flipping all bits at least once. No way possible to recover data after that.
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