Prospects for With Profit Bonds

Winners and Losers

Clearly With Profits is a very broad church. So, CL can't hack it. Hibernian and others are still strong enough to offer this product whose appeal to customers is stronger than ever.
 
With Profit

Troy
For how long do you think Hibernian and others can continue in this market given the current climate.
If as stated earlier Standars reserves are down from 10 billion to 1 billion.It must follow that Hibernian is in the same boat.They are cannot continue indefinitely along these lines.
It would appear to me that Canada have taken a very sensible approach on this occasion.
 
Media Watch

There is a truly staggering piece in today's Tribune.

CL are stating quite bluntly that new WPB customers are getting screwed by being suckered into a "Black Hole". When exactly did this realisation dawn? Markets have actually been improving for a month or so. Hence it is not as if the situation has now reached breaking point, that must have happened some time ago. Is CL going to offer customers who have entered since they discovered the Black Hole their money back?

More outrageous is that CL's marketing manager says that all funds are in the same position and should close immediately. There must be a law against this. Grant Barrans has already stated that there is no such problem at Hibernian. I trust that Hibernian will now issue a strongly worded Press Release rejecting these insinuations and assuring new customers that because of Hibernian's strong financial position they can fully expect a fair return on their investment. There is no legacy of a "black hole" which will negatively impinge their bonus prospects.
 
With Profit

Troy
If I were Grant Barrans I would keep my mouth shut.Canada Life may not be far off the mark on this one
 
S&P rating

Quote,

Very interesting. Do you have a link to Canada Life last review by S & P?
 
S&P

Having trouble with links but here are a few excerpts

TORONTO (Standard & Poor's) Feb. 6, 2002--Standard & Poor's today revised to negative from stable its outlook on Canada Life Assurance Co. At the same time, the ratings on Canada Life and its U.S. subsidiaries, including the double-'A' counterparty credit and financial strength ratings on Canada Life, were affirmed.


Standard & Poor's Rating Services said today it revised its outlook on the operating entities of the Aviva (formerly CGNU) insurance group to negative from stable. At the same time, the outlook on the group's U.K.-based holding company, Aviva PLC, was revised to negative from stable. The rating action follows Standard & Poor's revision of its outlook for the U.K. life sector to negative from stable (see the media release entitled "U.K. Life Insurance Sector Outlook Revised to Negative as Capital Market Volatility Persists", published on July 25, 2002, on RatingsDirect, Standard & Poor's Web-based credit analysis system).
 
Ironic or what?

So Canada Life's outlook is downgraded only because of Hibernian's parent's problems?
 
rating agencies

Given their performance in recent years,I don't think anyone should place any great credence on their ratings.The list of the countries and companies which have defaulted having been quite highly rated is as long as your arm.

If the agencies were in any other business (& there was more competition in that business),S&P and Moodys would have been put out of business after the Asian crisis of '98.

The recent situation where Japan's sovereign debt was rated the same as that of Botswana( to which Japan gives significant aid) says it all for me.

On the matter of the Canada Life move,time will tell.My own belief is that in more normal market environments there is little or no cross-subsidisation & all that is involved is smoothing.

However at a time when there are clearly massive deficits,it is to say the least unwise to invest in these funds.It may turn out that a wall of litigation will result from the whole thing & that providers who keep taking in money are sitting ducks for the legal eagles.
 
Solvency

[broken link removed]

Is it possible to tell from the above who will sink and who will swim taking into consideration that the figures are to the end of 2001.
 
Solvency

Good link Quote. G2 would seem to be the key ratio. On the face of it they nearly all look in trouble in so far as equity markets have fallen by way more that their Free Asset Ratios at the start of the year. However, the regulators keep changing the rules on how the liabilities are valued so it is not quite that simple.

Certainly Canada Life at 3.3% were at the very low end of the range, so not surprising to see them crack first.
 
Shifting the Goal Posts

Troy,

[broken link removed]
 
The Game is surely up

Today's Irish Times provides another instalment in this saga.

The startling new evidence is that they are all running for cover. Hibernian exposure to equities down to 46%. Friends First down to 39%. Scot Prov down to 40%. etc. etc.

Let's get real here, Bonds/Cash yield at very best 5%. Knock off charges and that's a bonus support level of about 3%. Throw in the equity "Black Hole" and the prospects for bonuses are grim indeed.

What's worse, by being out of equities even a stockmarket rebound will not close the BH. In effect solvency fears are driving these companies to resign themselves to the BH.

Yes, of course, Bonus rates are only going to come down about 1% next year. This is still more deception. The sustainable bonus rate next year is NIL but we must preserve the appearances of an orderly adjustment (except don't dare abuse this deception, you will be slapped with an MVA).

This product is way past its sell by date. Talk that this is suitable for cautious investors is baloney. How can intermediaries continue to sell this? (I think I know ). How can companies claim it is as valid an offering as ever? Why doesn't the Regulator intervene and force them to follow CL's example?
 
A Balanced View

I thought today's article in the Examiner was the most balanced so far in this, by now tedious, debate.

We are rightly drawn attention to the commercial self interests of those who are criticising WPBs.

I thought the best quote was as follows:<!--EZCODE QUOTE START--><blockquote>Quote:<hr> "Mark with profit funds down as low risk, low return investments, whose smoothing provides the ideal environment for cautious income withdrawals to support lifestyle and you won't be disappointed."<hr></blockquote><!--EZCODE QUOTE END-->Whilst every other journo is jumping on the bandwagan of this latest witchhunt it is good to see the greatest of them all take the contrasting line. Brokers should be grateful for this support from an unlikely source.
 
Re: The Game is surely up

<!--EZCODE ITALIC START--> As Southren View thought so highly of this article I have got the author's permission to reproduce it in full. <!--EZCODE ITALIC END-->

British media attention on With Profit funds is beginning to spill into Irish newspapers, and with billions at play, the debate aroused is no harm. But it’s important to separate important points from commercial agenda’s, especially when firms that lack the financial strength to compete in the sector, take a hand. With-profit funds invest in a diversified mix of assets including equities, fixed interest securities, property and cash. Much like any mixed fund the idea is to deliver competitive investment performance over the long-term. But there is one major difference. Actuarial science is used to give a smoothed return, ironing out the spikes and falls that naturally occur in asset values, to give a stable return. Critics of with-profits, quite correctly, point out that the arcane mixture of asset movements on the one hand and actuarial judgement calls on the other makes independent measurement impossible.

The ability of a life office to stretch its smoothing longer than others, covering the hole created during the current bear market, is ultimately a function of its financial strength. But measuring the strength of a life office is a difficult task, testing even credit rating agencies. This has largely to do with differences in how future liabilities are measured. Ultimately, the only person in a position to report on the precise position is the fund manager- hardly an independent source. Criticism of marketing and transparency is valid, but uninformed if it fails to recognise the intrinsic value of smoothed funds in financial planning, especially for retired investors seeking careful withdrawals to support lifestyle.

But, unhappily, unsustainable double digit yields on maturing policies sold during the 1970’s and 80’s has formed the centrepiece of marketing campaigns, painting with profit funds as some form of gravity defying equity based investment. In the Republic of Ireland alone over €1 billion poured in last year, a pattern repeated in the UK where over £15 billion was invested.

The success of a with-profit fund is not just a function of managing the underlying assets, but getting the smoothing right. Those with a commercial interest in criticising the with-profit sector focus on the likely shape of future smoothing, particularly when high annual bonuses are added despite large falls in underlying asset values. Postulations appear to be based on whatever assumed future asset growth helps the argument. But such analysis isn’t precise also because of the lack of disclosure characteristic of with-profit funds. Some funds, to protect long-term from short-term investors apply Market Value Reducers, as an early exit penalty. But the scale of MVR being applied may be an indication of the depth of falls in underlying asset values, exacerbated in one case by extra generous first year bonuses.

Still, in other cases, no MVR’s are currently applied. Standard Life whose AAA rating was recently renewed, and despite declines in its free asset ratio, has resolutely refused to apply MVR’s. But this is no guarantee that, in the face of any further stock market declines, MVR’s will not emerge at Europe’s largest mutual. Meanwhile, Eagle Star in Ireland, whose with-profit fund contains 60% in fixed interest securities, is also riding out the current bear market free of MVR’s. Last week Canada Life, a major player, announced the closure of its with-profit fund to new investment, reckoning that new investors would end up subsidising existing investors. But closing with-profit funds is not unexpected in bear markets, and shouldn’t be misinterpreted. Others may follow.

So, in the heat of debate how do you separate good from bad analysis. Firstly, ignore any scaremongering about solvency. Insolvency, a failure by a life office to meet with-profit guarantees, would require the loss of all free assets and a plummet through other thresholds including the required minimum margin, resilience reserves and further safety features built into the calculation of liabilities. Instead, expect (a) more with-profit funds to close for new business, (b) downward smoothing of bonus rates, and (c) reforms in the way in which information is provided. Ideally, investors should be have access to reports on the underlying fund value, its smoothed value and policy, its charges, and the cost of meeting guarantees.

When held over the long-term to maturity, with-profit investors should, reasonably experience returns in the range 2% to 4% above inflation. But it would be unwise to expect historic yields to be replicated. Maturing pension investments this year are recording yields over ten years ranging 9.5% to over 14% p.a., with similar yields for 15-year maturities. Longer term yields are higher, ranging from just under 13% p.a. to over 15% p.a. for 20-year maturities during which smoothing occurred during bear markets such as October 1987 and the Gulf War. Mark with-profit funds down as low risk, low return investments, whose smoothing provides the ideal environment for cautious income withdrawals to support lifestyle and you won’t be disappointed. But, expect with-profit funds to be an alternative to racy equity funds is a bit like expecting to win at the RDS, show jumping, on a camel.

Eddie Hobbs is a financial and management consultant, FDM, Summerhill House, The Curragh, Co. Kildare. Tel (045) 442051. E-mail ehobbs@indigo.ie.
 
Eddie's Analogies

Eddie is always good for an analogy. In the Examiner piece it is Camels and Showjumpers.

But a better one is in today's SBP where EH compares a WPB to a Tractor whilst a unit linked equity fund is like a Ferrari.

Let us stretch that one out a bit. Anybody getting on a Tractor two years ago is still limping along, albeit all four wheels are punctured, they will arrive at their destination though in a much slower time than they were promised. The Ferraris on the other hand have all gone crashing spectacularly into the gravel pit and would dearly wish they had got on a Tractor in the first place.

But here is the main point. Anyone considering investing today has a choice of a brand new Ferrari but there are no brand new Tractors, the only Tractors available are punctured in all four wheels. These are not suitable for anyone, except for the poor punters already on board for whom the pain in jumping off is probably worse than limping along to the finish!!

There are of course other modes of transport, not quite so exciting as a Ferrari but at least brand new and not chronically damaged.
 
Article

The theme appears to be that these funds can evade falls in values, which is incorrect. Paster is right. All funds have taken a hammering, but who said that in a prolonged depressed market With Profit investors aren't expected to feel pain too? They just get it in the neck later. The Examiner article was reasonably balanced from that view.
 
Eddie Rockets Return

How Eddie gets a projected with profit return of 2%-4% above inflation when over 60% of the with profit funds are invested in bonds is beyond me ?
 
Returns

At current European inflation it works out at 4% to 6%. Irish inflation is higher today, but can't continue without messing up the economy. At 4% it works out at 6% to 8%. Perhaps the bonds are Government and investment grade Coroporate bonds? I do know that the Eagle Star average dividend less costs has been 8% since 1979, but it's fallen this year to 6.5%. Under normal market conditions over the long term 2% real plus a percent or two doesn't appear unreasonable?