(iv) making strange assertions concerning one’s person/living status, for example:
“[1] We are living man & living woman. [2] We are not a ‘commercial corporations’; [3] Nor are we ‘things’ to be salvaged, nor are we a surety for either; [4] Thus we do not consent to this matter being heard in and under, statute/uniform commercial codified law 1933 format, and we do not consent to this matter being heard in and under maritime/ecclesiastical/canon law 1986 format. [5] As we are living and we are NOT dead – all title in our estates has been revested, with profits and interest – as per section IV of your cestui qui vie act of 1666”.
The just-quoted text is wanting in sense. As to [1], one cannot escape liability on a debt simply by dying. As to [2], no-one has ever claimed that any of the defendants is a company. As to [3], there is no suggestion that any of the defendants is a ‘thing’, and the court has no idea what the reference to salvage is supposed to convey. As to [4], the phrases “uniform commercial codified law 1933 format” and “maritime/ecclesiastical/canon law 1986 format” make no sense as a matter of Irish law. As to [5], the court is mystified by the reference to the Act of 1666. That was an Act enacted by the English Parliament in the reign of Charles II for England and Wales. (It was not until 1695 that the Irish Parliament adopted a similar measure by way of the Life Estates Act of that year). The preamble to the Act of 1666 indicates that its enactment was prompted by the fact that there had been situations where tenants for life effectively disappeared, causing difficulties for the landlord and any reversioners. Unless it could be proved that the tenant was actually dead, the estate could end up in a form of legal limbo. To avoid these problems, the Act allowed life tenants to be declared dead if they went missing for seven years or more. Thereafter, a landlord or reversioner could launch an action to recover the estate. But under s.IV if the tenant subsequently turned up alive, they could regain the estate along with damages. Leaving aside the territorial application of the Act of 1666, quite what any of this has to do with enforcing the loan in issue in these proceedings is entirely unclear to the court: what seems to be at play is a misreading of s.IV divorced from its historical context, express wording, and jurisdictional application, in short a form of legal nonsense.
(v) invoking irrelevant religious documentation, e.g., “The MOTO PROPRIO of francis is in full force and you are not immune from the criminal sanctions associated with same”. A ‘motu proprio’ is a form of papal document and the current Catholic pontiff – presumably the ‘Francis’ to whom reference is made, albeit using a disrespectful small ‘f’ – may be an esteemed gentleman but he has nothing to do with the enforcement of debts owing under Irish contract law and no role in Irish criminal law or in Irish law more generally.