I have raised this issue in other threads but it has tended to get choked off by other aspects. We need a clear honest answer to this. Many academics have publicly called on the bondholders to take the hit and Fine Gael has latched on to this. The official line seems to be that this would be disaster though it has not really been explained why. My take is as follows:darag said:And yes I agree that one of the most important issues is whether the bondholders can be made take some of the hit. But we haven't even gotten to ordinary bondholders yet. The current NAMA plan allows the shareholders and the unsubordinated bond holders to keep all their money.
Good thread.But bondholders have a completely different legal status. If a company defaults on its bonds that company is bankrupt. That means liquidation/receivership, forced sale of assets etc. The deposit guarantee would be fully triggerred.
In non bank cases (e.g General Motors) this threat of, or actual, receivership can be used to negotiate bondholders to accept the best of a bad lot by doing some equity swap deal.
But in the case of the banks the bondholders hold all the cards, they know that the threat of liquidation is not on.
If the bonds rank with deposits, then even to suspend interest payments constitutes a default. According to BL, and he is supported by an opinion piece in the same paper, any default would be a catastrophe. It seems we just have to keep faith with international bondholders or else the costs of funding Ireland Inc will completely balloon or not be available at all.
It is the case that a decision has been made, as part of the State Aid submission made to the EU, not to make interest payments on certain subordinated debt of Anglo Irish Bank, but this is a very different situation.
First, the market does distinguish somewhat between senior and subordinated debt, and secondly subordinated debt of its nature carries with it different sets of terms and conditions, such that interest payments can in appropriate circumstances be deferred or left unpaid.
This is not the same as a default and certainly does not impact on any debt currently guaranteed by the Government.
This subordinated debt is different from senior debt which includes other types of bonds, such as certificates of deposits and commercial paper. Senior bonds are not part of the banks’ risk capital – they are part of the banks’ normal funding in the same way deposits are. Generally, they rank equally with ordinary deposits in a wind up situation, and they are issued at interest rates that reflect their much lower expected risk profile compared to subordinated debt.
1) If the banks were nationalised it would take a very long time for international investors to trust and invest in Ireland again.
Is there any evidence or precedents to support this contention that they won't invest in Ireland again? How do you know?They will survive writing off their Irish Investments but it will be a long time before we see them in this Country again and we can't survive without them.
Precisely; I have no idea where this doomsday idea that investors would never put money into Irish enterprises ever again if the holders of the banks' bonds had to take a haircut.I take a lot of these warnings with a very large pinch of salt. These investments aren't driven by emotion. Most of the investment decisions are being driven by software. If the return is going to be there, then the investment will come.
I know that investors have quite short memories even in the case of the government bond default in Russia. Even the serial offenders in the South America seem to attract investors after a year or two. And in fact these are extreme cases which involve default on government bonds. Bondholders take haircuts all the time without anyone seriously arguing that the government step in to compensate them in order to "encourage future investment".
This only tells one side of the story. It tells you that market prefers NAMA to the vacuum that went before, but it doesn't tell you anything about how the market might view the alternatives, such as making the bondholders pay along with either FG's 'good bank' or Labour's temporary nationalisation.Price can be taken as empirical evidence. The price of Irish Gvt credit default swaps has narrowed from 262 bps in March to 169 bps currently. ( Source Bank Credit Analyst- an independent internatnal research house) How much of this we attribute to increased confidence in our national and bank solvency as a direct result of NAMA and how much we attribute to general credit market recovery we can debate about forever. For arguments sake lets assume NAMA has accounted for 25% of that recovery i.e 23bps. For a full year borrowing requirement of €25bn that saves the Govt €57mio. If we assume a stable €25bn Govt borrowing requirement for the next 5 years total savings would be €687 mio. This figure is a loose calculation assuming all debt issued remains in issue.
There is an even greater CDS price contraction for AIB and BOI approx 300bps narrower than in March, however the banks have not been able to issue significant levels of long term debt to take advantage of this yet.
This only tells one side of the story. It tells you that market prefers NAMA to the vacuum that went before, but it doesn't tell you anything about how the market might view the alternatives, such as making the bondholders pay along with either FG's 'good bank' or Labour's temporary nationalisation.
How do you think the taxpayers will react if they are forced to pay, even though there is no legal obligation on them to do so.Seriously how do you think the market react if they announced that senior bondholders will be forced to pay even though there is no legal obligation on them to.
But what is that risk? They made a judgement that at least with the Big Two they could not be allowed to go into liquidation. So the risk was that they would be nationalised and that the Government, as is its right, would legislate to selectively screw the bondholders. That was the risk they took and they still take that risk no more than holders of Post Office Savings Certificates take a risk that they might be defaulted.Sunny, surely when investors put their money into bonds, they accept there is a risk.
How do you think the taxpayers will react if they are forced to pay, even though there is no legal obligation on them to do so.
There are no easy solutions here, and the bondholders have to take their pain.
So how do we know what damage it might or might not cause?No Government has done it with senior debt holders.
We use cookies and similar technologies for the following purposes:
Do you accept cookies and these technologies?
We use cookies and similar technologies for the following purposes:
Do you accept cookies and these technologies?