Super cycles do not exist Commodity super-cycles are an investment chimera but are a popular concept because on occasions – 1978/81, 2003/06 - large gains can quickly be made. The pattern of each boom is remarkably similar, be it cocoa, steel, maize or copper. Essentially they commence after a long period of weak demand, or over-supply, resulting in poor returns on capital and miniscule profit margins. Thus very little new investment takes place. Gradually, some producers go bust, stockpiles soar and the least incompetent or best capitalised operators hang on by a thread. Then an ‘event’ occurs which disrupts supply – it could be war, weather, or politics - or demand increases through a change in the economic growth rate. Shrunken capacity is insufficient, so prices soar, stockpiles vanish and the commodity producer has a field day. Every cycle accelerates about half way up the price curve, as speculators and gamblers join the easy-money party. Then within one to four years, three events take place. First, high prices bring on stream previously unprofitable operations, be it low grade copper mines in Central America or marginal wheat lands adjoining Australia’s deserts. Next, substitution kicks in dramatically: between 1979 and 1985, the weight of the average American auto declined by almost a half in response to both high metal and oil prices. Third is the classic response to any commodity boom - those whose earnings cannot increase enough to buy commodities at these higher prices are simply squeezed out of the market; i.e. poor people starve when food prices soar. This has been, and will be the history of all commodity cycles.
Close to, or just past the peak, totally irrational behaviour takes over and we meet ‘The Church of
the Super Cycle’. Its apostles, whose message is forever ‘this time it’s different’ always have a
slightly different excuse why the coffee, zinc or uranium cycle will run forever, even though they
know it has never happened before. It is particularly odd: for these people, outside their highly paid
hobby of investing other people’s money, are normally pleasant and rational human beings.
The fourth quarter of 2005 was an interesting example of this phenomenon for several
commodities. We will focus solely on oil. Within weeks of the devastating hurricanes Rita and
Katrina causing an oil price surge to nearly $80 per barrel, there was overwhelming evidence that
world supply exceeded demand by between half a million and two million barrels per day (on a
daily production rate of around 85 million barrels). This has remained the case for the last fifteen
months and whilst every world oil storage facility is brimming over, tankers are steaming as slowly
as possible to their destinations, because there is no storage capacity left. Industrial nations,
including China, have become slightly less oil inefficient; 2006 was one year of only four since
1945 when world oil consumption actually fell. Changing economic activity also kicked in: China
switched much power production to coal and macho American SUVs were left unsold as more fuel
efficient and lighter Asian automobiles were snapped up. Such information was available in free
newspapers.
Institutional investors however, having avoided significant exposure to oil companies at $25 or $45
per barrel in the three years to 2005, then decided in 2006 as the price peaked that oil was the sure
fire, no-risk, and super-cycle safe investment. As a consequence, the sector last year witnessed not
only the largest number of new issues worldwide (many now trading below their offer prices), but
the highest level of net new investment of any major sector. Despite this inflow, oil shares
generally performed poorly.
We have not held a single oil, gas or coal share since the end of the first quarter in 2006. Although
we have no idea where the price is going (but our guess is down, down, then down), so utterly
clear was the data showing supply thumping demand that this was hardly a genius call. We even
tried modelling supply and demand on the assumption that the two key countries behind higher
consumption - China and America - grow at record rates: still the oil market had a problem. So it
remains very puzzling why so many rational people persist with such dramatic denial, as
demonstrated in their investment portfolios.