Sometimes the NASDAQ is referred to as an asset class, but it's not. It's an exchange that contains several asset classes. A partial index of NASDAQ stocks might proxy for a tech stock "asset class"—but there's little theoretical reason to think tech stocks are an asset class either.
Talking about what is or isn't an asset class might seem trivial, but it's important because people use asset classes as key components of diversified portfolios. For this purpose each asset class needs to have a specific risk-return function.
Sorting securities on anything other than the dimensions of expected returns can fudge the clarity of the investment process and undermine portfolio diversification. When investors mistake where returns come from, the asset classes they assemble become arbitrary. This can lead to inadvertent tilts on the underlying factors that actually determine returns.
For example, investors sometimes manage industry exposure, as if sectors constitute asset classes. Analysts on TV talk about what companies produce and how it affects the prospects for their stock prices. As Adam Smith pointed out over 200 years ago, a company's industry bears no direct relation to the flow of capital.1 Expected returns relate far more to a company's health and size than to whatever it is that the company makes or does.
In "Industry Costs of Equity", 2 Fama and French cast Adam Smith's notion in an empirical light. They find that risk factors of market, size, and book-to-market seem to account for virtually all the differences in returns across industry groups (except real estate stocks, which for that reason probably constitute their own asset class). For example, if technology stocks had spectacular performance in the late 1990s, it wasn't because of a new business model, but because tech stocks happened to be growth stocks in a market that strongly favoured growth. Lots of investors projecting ahead to a "new economy" were left holding the bag when growth stocks went out of favour.
We should instead set out to sort stocks along the true explanatory dimensions—in the above case by forming a growth portfolio—and include whatever industries happen to fit that asset class. After all, industries drift in and out of asset classes. They get bigger and smaller, healthier and more distressed through time. Tech stocks might have been growth stocks back in 2000, but many stocks are now considered smaller companies or perhaps in the value category. Sorting stocks on secondary criteria like industries can therefore cause a portfolio to drift across asset classes.
Investors should determine how much exposure to have to stocks in general (market risk), and how much of a tilt to have based on company size and value which represent dimensions of equity markets with their own risk-return profiles.
Asset classes are most relevant when sorted along these dimensions, as combinations of "small cap," "large cap," "value," and "growth." These asset classes are transparent, focused, and consistent with research.
1. Smith, Adam, "Employment of Capitals", The Wealth of Nations, 1776.
2. Fama, Eugene F., and French, Kenneth R., "Industry Costs of Equity", Journal of Financial Economics, 1997.
You state in the footnote Value stocks are above 30%, surely you mean above 70%.